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NOTES
ADMIRALTY-CLAIMS AGENT'S MISREPRESENTATION OF LAW
HELD NOT To VITIATE SEAMAN'S AGREEMENT RELEASING
SHIPOWNER.-Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co., 218 F.2d 664
F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1955).
The plaintiff, a seaman, was attacked and injured by a fellow crew-
man. A claims agent told him that he had a weak case unless he could
prove that the shipowner had notice of the assailant's dangerous propen-
sities. Without independent medical advice concerning the severity of
his injury and without legal advice concerning the validity of his claim,
the plaintiff negotiated a settlement releasing the shipowner. The in-
juries proved to be more serious than the plaintiff had thought, and he
sued the shipowner. Relying upon Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194F.2d 516 (2d Gir. 1952), decided after the release was executed, he con-
tended, inter alia, that the agent had erroneously represented the scopeof the shipowner's li bility. The district court set aside the release and
rendered judgment for the plaintiff. Reversed and remanded. The ma-
jority, speaking colloquially, refused to give the Keen decision the retro-active effect of making the agent s statement a misrepresentation of law.
On rehearing two judges dissented with respect to this point.Seamen are considered wards of admiralty and in scrutinizing their
releases courts treat them' as courts of equity treat young heirs dealingwith their expectancies, cestuis que trustent with their trustees, or wards
with their guardians. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239(1942); Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Gas. 480, No. 6047 (G.G.D. Me.
1823). In release cases where seamen's injuries prove to be more serious
than originally supposed, the impact of this policy upon the law of mis-
take has resulted in a liberal attitde toward granting rescission. Gar-
rett v. Moore-McCormack Co., supra; cf. Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R.,332 U.S. 625 (1948). If a settlement is made, seemingly a fact issue is
presented: did the parties assume the extent of the injuries then known
as the basis of relief, or did they intend to compromise the claim regard-
less of the possibility of more serious developments? See S WILLISTON,
CONwtACTS e 151 (rev. ed. 1937). However, the tenor of some decisions
involving seamen indicates reliance upon a presumption that the re-
leasor had in mind only the seriousness of injuries known when he
signed his release. In Stuart v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 14 F.2d 178, 179 (2d CDir.
1944), the court said that the trial judge had overstated the vulnerabilityof seamen's releases in declaring that they meant practically nothing;
nevertheless, it set aside the instmnent involved, apparently on the
ground that the plaintiff's injuries proved more serious than previously
contemplated. Similarly, it has been indicated that relief will be granted
whenever the prognosis relied upon is made by the defendant's physi-
cian and proves to be incorrect. United States v. Johnson, 160 F.2d 789
(9th Gir. 1947), reversed in part on other grounds, 333 U.S. 46 (1948);
Bonici v. Standard Oil Co., 103 F.2d18 437 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
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308 U.S. 560 (1939). However, where the seaman has utilized a physi-
cian of his own choosing, relief for mistake may be denied. Sitchon v.
American Export Lines, 113 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 705 (1940). In the principal case the court adopts a more stringent
view in stating that the purpose of a settlement presupposes a joint ap-
proximation of the future, thus casting on the seaman the risk of subse-
quent developments, even though the prognosis is made by a neutral party
rather than by a doctor chosen by the plaintiff. Of course, where a mistake
relates to an injury foreign to those considered by the parties in the first
instance, a release will not be given effect. See, e.g., Hume v. Moore-
McCormack Lines, 121 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
684 (1941).
Formerly the courts considered a misrepresentation of law an in-
sufficient ground for rescission because it was an opinion not justifying
reliance. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1591 (rev. ed. 1937). But the fed-
eral courts have tended to grant relief for a misake of law induced by a
misrepresentation either where an element of fraud is present or where
the parties' relationship is such that reliance by one on the other's state-
ments may be expected. Griswold v. Hazard, 141 U.S. 260 (1891); Snell
v. Atlantic Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 98 U.S. 85 (1878); 3 CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 618 (1951). Similarly, between a layman and one who is sup-
posed to have superior legal knowledge, even innocent misstatements of
law have been held actionable. Camerlin v. New York Central R.R., 199
F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1952); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1495, 1500 (rev.
ed. 1937). In consonance with the policy of treating seamen as wards of
admiralty it seems that any material misrepresentation of law charge-
able to a shipowner would justify setting aside a release singed in re-
liance upon it. However, the situation presented in the principal case
calls for inquiry into the propriety of extending this policy to statements,
later shown to be erroneous, concerning undecided points of law.
Presumably, most seamen are ignorant of legal principles and, in con-
sidering the wisdom of signing a release, will be influenced by the opinion
of one who is conversant with the law. Cf. Camerlin v. New York Cen-
tral R.R., supra. Consequently, in determining the validity of a release
the federal courts carefully examine the sufficiency of legal advice ac-
corded a seaman and frequently decline to uphold the agreement if he
was without benefit of legal counsel and was unfamiliar with his legal
rights. Muruaga v. United States, 172 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1949); Hume v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, supra. An attorney settling with a seaman
does so in a fiduciary capacity. Blake v. W. R. Chamberlin & Co., 176
F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1949). A seaman's release will be avoidable unless he
is appraised of all causes of action in his favor and has a full understand-
ing of his legal rights. Waters v. United States, 191 F.2d 212 (9th Cir.
1951); Bay State Dredging & Contracting Co. v. Porter, 153 F.2d 827
(1st Cir. 1946). In view of the fiduciary nature of the duty owed by one
securing a seaman's release, it appears that he, not the seaman, should




BANKS AND BANKING-BILLS AND NOTES-RiGHTS OF DEPOSI-
TARY BANK AGAINST DRAWER OF CHECK.--City State Bank
v. Lummus, 277 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarilio
1954, error ref'd n.r.e.).
Because of failure of consideration the defendant stopped payment of
a check deposited with the plaintiff bank, which before receiving notice
of the stop order had permitted the payee-depositor to withdraw the
amount represented by the check. The trial court entered judgment for
the defendant. Reversed and rendered. The court stated, inter alia, that
the defendant had the burden of establishing that the bank "had not be-
come a party thereto for value."
Before the matter was regulated by statute most jurisdictions held that
title to a deposited item presumptively passed to the bank, Gonyer v.
Williams, 168 Cal. 452, 143 Pac. 736 (1914); Craige v. Hadley, 99 N.Y.
131, 1 N.E. 537 (1885), but a substantial minority presumed a relation-
ship of principal and agent. First Nat'l Bank v. Fleming State Bank, 74
Cal. 309,221 Pac. 891 (1924). Before 1929 Texas courts followed the ma-
jority rule, Farmers' State Bank v. Hardie, 230 S.W. 524 (Tex.Civ.App.
1921), but in that year a short bank collection statute adopted the mi-
nority rule. TEx. LAws 1st Called Sess. 1929, c.97 subc. VII, art. 2. See
also Holt v. First State Bank, 32 S.W.2d 386 (Tex.Civ.App. 1930).
Most of the eighteen states which have adopted the Bank Collection
Code, produced by the American Bankers' Association, hold that unless
the parties agree otherwise, the bank does not become owner of the item
until the proceeds are collected. Schram v. Askegaard, 34 F.2d 348 (D.
Minn. 1929); Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Pringle, 55 Idaho 451, 43
P.2d 515 (1935); Farmers' Exchange Bank v. Farm & Home Savings &
Loan Ass'n, 332 Mo. 1041, 61 S.W.2d 717 (1933); State v. South Omaha
State Bank, 129 Neb. 43, 260 N.W. 815 (1935). These decisions seem
based on a literal interpretation of the statutes. However, some states
with the model code have held that when the amount of the item de-
posited has been withdrawn, the bank becomes the owner of the item
and the statute does not apply. This conclusion is buttressed by the
reasoning that (1) the statute applies only when the deposit is explicitly
for collection, Lawton v. Lower Main Street Bank, 170 S.C. 334, 170 S.E.
469 (1933); (2) the statute is for the benefit of the bank and the bank
can waive its status of agent, Community State Bank v. Durbin, 98
N.E.2d 604, (Ind. App. 1951); and (3) the checking and withdrawal of
the deposit constitute an "agreement" to pass title, although this can be
rebutted by showing that the deposit was intended for collection. Blatz
Brewing Co. v. Richardson & Richardson, Inc., 245 Wis. 567, 15 N.W.2d
819 (1944).
Under the Texas Bank Collection Act of 1943, which derived its pro-
visions from the model code, the bank is the agent of the depositor, ex-
cept as to holders in due course, unless there is an agreement to the
contrary, and this agency relationship continues until the bank receives
the proceeds of the item. If the bank honors checks against the deposit
it is deemed to be a creditor secured by a lien on the item. TEx. Civ. STAT.
(Vernon, 1948) art. 342-702. On facts similar to those in the principal
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case, it was held that the statutory exceptions concerning agreements
and holders in due course rendered the statute inapplicable, and the bank
became the owner when the depositor withdrew the money represented
by the check. First Nat'l Bank v. Moore, 220 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.Civ.App.
1949, error dism'd). However, a cogent argument has been made that a
bank cannot be a holder in due course until the proceeds of the check
are collected, since it remains an agent until that time. See Sneed and
Morrison, Bank Collections-A Comparative Study, 29 TEXAS LAW
Bnvinw 713, 724 (1951). It is further submitted that the exception con-
cerning holders in due course for value refers to subsequent holders, and
not to the depositary bank. The model Bank Collection Code contains the
word "subsequent," but does not employ it in reference to the depositary
bank.
The bank must qualify as a holder in due course to avoid the maker's
personal defense of failure of consideration. TEx. CIV. STAT. (Vernon,
1948) art. 5935, S 57. To attain that status the bank must be a "holder"
of the check. The Negotiable Instruments Law defines "holder" as the
payee or indorsee of a bill who is in possession, or the bearer thereof.
"Bearer" is defined as the person in possession of a bill or note which is
payable to bearer. TEx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5948, g 191. The
decisions have not been uniform because of the varied meanings at-
tributed to the term "possession." In some states a holder is the possessor
of the paper itself who demands payment for himself or as agent for
another, including a bank holding the paper for collection. Mechanics and
Metals Nat'l Bank v. Termini, 117 Misc. 309, 191 N.Y.S. 334 (App. Div.
1921); Forbes State Bank v. Higgins, 58 S.D. 497,237 N.W. 735 (1931).
However, it seems the better view that one having mere physical custody
of a check for collection is not the holder thereof, Commercial & Savings
Bank v. Southern Trust & Commerce Bank, 74 Cal. App. 734, 241 Pac.
945 (1925); to be so classified the claimant must have a beneficial in-
terest in the check and be entitled at law to recover the proceeds. National
Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257 (1904); Bower v. Casanave, 441
F.Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Crocker-Woolworth Nat'l Bank v. Nevada
Bank, 139 Cal. 564, 73 Pac. 456 (1903); Pryor v. American Trust &
Banking Co., 15 Ga. App. 828, 84 S.E. 312 (1915); Buckman v. Hilt
Military Academy, 182 Ore. 621, 189 P.2d 575 (1948).
In the principal case the court did not insist on proof of a beneficial
interest in the check, but nonetheless considered the bank to be a holder
and applied section 24 of the NIL, stating that every person whose signa-
ture appears on an instrument is deemed prima facie to have given
value. TEx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5933, § 24. Since the drawer
failed to establish that the bank did not give value for the check, the bank
was presumed a holder in due course. By virtue of the exception in
article 342-702 respecting holders of negotiable instruments, as con-
strued by the Moore case, the case was removed from the operation of
that statute. Other jurisdictions with similar collection statutes acknowl-
edge the agency relationship but consider the bank a holder in due course
to the extent of withdrawals made by the depositor before notice of dis-
honor. Nat'l Deposit Bank v. Ohio Oil Co., 250 Ky. 288, 62 S.W.2d 1049
(1933); Citizens' Bank v. Kilpatrick, 231 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. App. 1950);
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Western Smelting &e Refining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 150 Neb. 477, 35
N.W.2d 116 (1948). The bank's statutory lien on the check is a bene-
ficial interest which makes it a holder under either definition.
Texas courts have held that if all parties know that a deposit is for col-
lection, the owner retains a beneficial interest, Behringer v. City Nat'l
Bank, 296 S.W. 674 (Tex.Civ.App. 1927), and when an indorsee takes
legal title as agent of the payee, he is subject to all defenses to which the
payee is subject. Blum v. Loggins, 63 Tex. 121 (1880); King v. Wise,
282 S.W. 570 (Tex.Comm. App. 1926); National Trust & Credit Co. v.
Oliver, 203 S.W. 608 (Tex.Civ.App. 1918). Therefore, it seems that a
depositary bank should be treated as a holder only to the extent that it
can establish a beneficial interest in the item by virtue of the lien con-
ferred by article 342-702. Section 27 of the NIL provides that wher6 6
holder who has a lien on an instrument is deemed a holder in due course
for value to the extent of the lien, TEx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art.
5933, § 27, but he must show his advancements on the instrument to per-
fect the lien. Chapman v. Dallas, 267 S.W. 636 (Tex.Civ.App. 1924).
Article 342-702 and section 27 of the NIL seemingly require the bank to
prove that it has advanced money against a deposited item and thus has
acquired a beneficial interest which alters its status as agent and permits
it to avoid defenses good against the payee. If so, the court's statement
concerning burden of proof in the principal case is questionable, though
the result reached is sound.
Frank W. Elliott, Jr.
DEDICATION-IMPLIED DEDICATION MANIFESTED BY LAND-
OWNER'S CONDUCT.-Trappey's Sons, Inc. v. New Iberia,
73 So.2d423 (La. 1954).
The defendant city opened a street across the plaintiff's land for use as
a by-pass while a nearby street was being paved After the new way had
been used a few years the plaintiff conveyed to the city an easement ap-parently corresponding with the way then in use. The following yea he
executed a correction deed designed to alter the right of way previously
designated. Thereafter he sought an injunction and certain other relief
against the city. The lower court denied relief, relying upon a tacit dedi-cation. On appeal the plaintiff conten ed that the correction deed, ac-
cepted by the city, was controing and that the permissive prior use
should not be regarded as evidencing a dedication other than the con-
tractual one. Affirmed. The court concluded that despite the correction
deed a dedication could properly be implied in view of the plaintiff's
acquiescence in public maintenance and use of the original way.
A dedication is implied when a landowner's acts manifest an intentionto devote his property to public use, see Kingman v. Wagner, 168 Kan.
668, 213 P.2d 979, 982 (1960) (dictum), if public use--usually coupled
with maintenance-is of such a character as to manifest an acceptance
of the dedication. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Sweatman, 81 Ga. App. 269,
58 S.E.2d 663 (1960). Many opinions, like that in the principal case, i-




Most courts hold that public rights may be acquired by prescription,
relying upon either a presumed antecedent exercise of the power of
eminent domain, Windham p. Jubinville, 92 N.H. 102, 25 A.2d 415
(1942), or a presumed prior dedication. See Couture v. County of Dade,
93 Fla. 342, 112 So. 75 (1927) (dictum). A few courts refuse to recog-
nize prescriptive public rights, reasoning that the doctrine of prescrip-
tion traditionally has rested upon the fiction of a lost grant, Piper v.
Voorhees, 130 Me. 305, 155 AtI. 556 (1931), and that the unorganized
public cannot take under a grant. See Gore v. Blanchard, 96 Vt. 234, 118
Atl. 888, 891 (1922). ANGELL, HIGhRWAY § 131 (1858); Comment, 6
TxAs LAW REviEw 365 (1928). Courts adopting this view treat con-
tinued public use either as evidence of the owner's intent to dedicate,
German Bank v. Brose, 32 Ind. App. 77, 69 N.E. 300 (1903), or as a basis
for presuming intent to dedicate, La Chappelle v. Jewett City, 121 Conn.
381, 185 AtI. 175 (1936); Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Crownpoint,
150 Ind. 636,50 N.E. 741 (1898).
Any period of use may be treated as evidence of an intent to dedicate,
Hankins v. Pine Bluff, 217 Ark. 226,229 S.W.2d 231 (1950), but a court
is unlikely to invoke a presumption against the owner unless the use has
continued over a substantial period. Some courts have resorted to the
analogous statutory limitation period. Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga.
705, 30 S.E.2d 627 (1944). Expiration of the period constituting a bar
to real actions is usually sufficient of itself to create the presumption,
Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Sweatman, 81 Ga. App. 269, 58 S.E.2d 553
(1950), particularly where other evidence tends to show the intent to
dedicate. Kendall-Smith Co. v. Lancaster County, 84 Neb. 654, 121 N.W.
960 (1909). However, the presumption may arise from a shorter public
use accompanied by other acts indicating the intent. In re Petition of
Bryant, 323 Mich. 424, 35 N.W.2d 371 (1949). The presumption has
been held conclusive, Diamond Match Co. v. Savercool, 218 Cal. 665,
24 P.2d 783 (1933), where the use was with the owner's full knowledge,
although without his permission, and without objection by anyone. Hare
v. Craig, 206 Cal. 753,276 Pac. 336 (1929).
Under either theory, it is the adverse possession and use which es-
tablishes the street; it seems immaterial which approach is utilized-
presumption of dedication, evidence of intent to dedicate, or acquisition
of a prescriptive right-in light of the identical conclusion reached. See
Walcott Township v. Skauge, 6 N.D. 382, 71 N.W. 544 (1897).
To establish a prescriptive right or raise a presumption, it is apparent
that adverseness, or claim of right is needed. Summerville v. Duke Power
Co., 115 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1940); King County v. Hagen, 30 Wash.2d
847, 194 P.2d 357 (1948). While it is normally immaterial whether the
street is created by dedication or by prescription, the landowner who be-
lieves his permission rebuts the element of adverseness or claim of right
necessary to establish a prescriptive right may find his conduct construed
as creating a persumptive intent to dedicate. Mere permissiveness alone,
however, does not establish a highway by prescription, Swinford v.
Roper, 389 ll. 340, 59 N.E.2d 863 (1945), or raise a presumption of dedi-
cation, Stanley v. Mullins, 187 Va. 193, 45 S.E.2d 881 (1948). If the per-
mission is revocable at will, and the public has not obtained full dominion
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over the way, no public right is established. See Stanley v. Mullins, supra.
Similarly, if the allowed public use is consistent with the landowner's
assertion of ownership, no public right is created. In Gage v. Mobile &
Ohio R.R., 84 Ala. 224, 4 So. 415 (1888), where the owner permitted
public use of an alley connecting his wharves with the main streets, the
court said that enjoyment with consent, consistent with the rights and
interests of the true owner, evidences no conveyance to the public and
establishes no adverse right.
However, adverseness may be inferred from the parties' situation and
the manner, character, and frequency of the exercise of the right. Han-
sen v. Green, 275 M. 221, 113 N.E. 982 (1916). The final determination
apparently turns upon the proposition that the public use must be predi-
cated on the belief or assertion of a public right. Sprow v. Boston & A.
R.R., 163 Mass. 330, 39 N.E. 1024 (1895). Consent or acquiescence may
frequently amount to an implied recognition of the adverse claim of the
public, Town of Exeter v. Meras, 80 N.H. 132, 114 At. 24, 25 (1921)
(dictum); hence a cautious landowner will often take other precaution-
ary measures. Payment of taxes, Beauman v. Boeckeler, 119 Mo. 189,
24 S.W. 207 (1893), conveyancing, Hall v. Baltimore, 56 Md. 187
(1881), and the erection of bars or gates across the way are evidence in
rebuttal of the public's rights. See People v. Sayig, 101 Cal. App.2d 890,
226 P.2d 702 (1951).
The owner cannot limit the duration of his dedication, San Francisco
v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541 (1872), for he cannot attach to the dedication
any condition or limitation inconsistent with its legal character or tend-
ing to remove the property from the control of the public authorities.
Darling v. Christensen, 166 Or. 17, 109 P.2d 585 (1941). The dedication
will be effective regardless of such a condition. Camdenton v. Sho-Me
Power Corp., 361 Mo. 790, 237 S.W.2d 94 (1951).
The confusion between the doctrines of prescription and implied dedi-
cation may be eliminated by declaring mere public use insufficient by
itself to raise a presumption, over the owner's objection, of an intent to
dedicate. Only where the owner is fully cognizant of and makes no ob-
jection to the use, the character of which would evidence to prudent men
the public adverse claim, should it be presumed that he intended to dedi-
cate the property to the public. See Robison v. Gebauer, 98 Neb. 196, 152
N.W. 329 (1915); 1 ELLIOTT, ROADS AND STREETS, § 179 (3d ed. 1911).
On the other hand, where the use continues for the requisite statutory
period and the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive right in the
public are present, the necessary protection of public rights should not be
jeopardized by a declaration that in all cases prescriptive use is mere
evidence of dedication, or raises a presumption of dedication.
Monty Barber
DISCOVERY-AMOUNT OF INDEMNITY INSURANCE HELD NOT
DIScoVERABLE FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF EVALUATING CASE FOR
SETTLEMENT. - Jeppesen v. Swanson, 68 N.W.2d 649
(Minn. 1955).
In an action alleging that personal injuries were caused by the negli-
gence of the relator's truck driver, the plaintiff moved for and obtained
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an order, pursuant to MINN. R. Civ. P. 34, for the production of the
relator's indemnity insurance policy. The affidavit in support of the
motion stated only that the plaintiff's attorneys could not "properly
evaluate a figure for settlement or trial" without knowing the extent of
insurance coverage. On the relator's application the appellate court pro-
hibited enforcement of the order.
MINN. R. Civ. P. 34, identical with FED. R. Civ. P. 34, requires that
documents sought to be discovered constitute or contain evidence relating
to- matters within the scope of examination permitted by the rule govern-
ing depositions, MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02, FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b). That rule
pro.vides that a "witness may be examined regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action." The further provision that "It is not grounds for objection that
the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
deuice . . ." was adopted to prevent stringent interpretation. 4 MooRx,
FEDERAL PRACTiCE 26.17 (2d ed. 1950). TEx. R. Civ. P. 167 states that
documents sought by discovery must "constitute or contain evidence"
and does not refer to the more liberal test of relevancy to the subject
matter.
In the principal case the majority opinion interprets "relevant to the
subject matter of the action" as meaning relevant to the substantive issues
of trial, relying on Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), for the
proposition that discovery was designed to facilitate ascertainment of the
precise issues and of the facts (or information leading to the facts) related
to the issues. However, in denying discovery of an attorney's "work
product" in that case the Court explicitly considered the practical effect
of the statute, particularly the idea that to allow discovery would tend to
make the bar parasitic; it was not concerned with verbal niceties of statu-
tory language. To bloster their position the Minnesota court analogized
discovery of the defendant's insurance coverage and the extent of his
prvate fortune. In support of the analogy the court quoted the entire
opinion of McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1952), which
also denied discovery of insurance as not relevant to the substantive issues
of trial. The dissent in the principal case distinguished discovery of de-
fendant's financial resources m that, unlike insurance coverage, sufficientinformation is readily available before trial by garnishment proceedingsor by access to private credit agencies.
It has been asserted that the insurance contract virtually substitutes
the insurance company as a party defendant by placing it in control of
the entire defense, and that a person injured by the insured has an interest
in the contract, analogous to that of a third-party beneficiary, which justi-
fies requiring that its terms be disclosed to him. Brackett v. Woodall Food
Products, 12 F.R.D. 4, (D. Tenn. 1951); 32 NEB. L. Rlv. 106 (1952);
5 STAN. L. REv. 322, 324, 326 (1953); Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d
939 (Ky. 1954). Accord, Orgel v. McCurdy, 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y.
1948). Allowing discovery of insurance would eliminate the possibility of
a fraudulent settlement obtained by a false disclosure concerning insur-
ance coverage-a possibility which the plaintiff has no other means of
avoiding short of industrial espionage. See Toppass v. Perkins' Adm'x,
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268 Ky. 186, 104 S.W.2d 423 (1937); Pattison v. Highway Ins. Under-
writers, 278 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.Civ.App. 1955, error ref'd n.r.e.).
The relevancy of insurance disclosure to the subject matter of the
action depends upon the scope attributed to "subject matter." Are settle-
ment tactics a part of the judicial process which should be guided by
court rules? As an indication of the practical relevancy of insurance to
the great mass of out-of-court negotiations assume that D's alleged negli-
gence has resulted in personal injuries to the extent of $30,000. For
simplicity, further assume that D is solvent and that P has an even chance
of recovery; thus there is a theoretical settlement value of $15,000. See
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 Hnv.
L. RFv. 1136 (1954). What is the importance of the amount of D's insur-
ance with X company?
If D's insurance with X company were below this $15,000 theoretical
settlement value (e.g., $10,000), it would normally profit both D and X
to disclose the low limit of coverage and hope for settlement. If the
insurance coverage should exceed the damages, D would be indifferent
to disclosure and X would probably go to trial unless P offered to settle
for the settlement value or less. If, however, the policy limit should lie
between the settlement value and maximum damages (e.g., $20,000) D
would be anxious to disclose and settle within policy limits rather than
risk the possible personal loss of $10,000. But X, who has complete control
of defense and settlement, would ordinarily profit by taking a substan-
tially free ride to trial on its limited liability of $20,000; by the above
hypothesis that there is an even chance of losing the case, the settlement
value to X is only $10,000. Thus if X accepted $16,000 in settlement, he
would avoid the possibility of losing an additional $4,000, but would
sacrifice $6,000 above its theoretical settlement value. However, the rule
in most states is that an insurer must show due care or good faith in
dealing with the defendant's interest while negotiating for settlement;
hence, if X gambles D's money by refusing to settle within the policy
limit, it may be found liable for damages awarded to the injured person
exceeding the policy limit. See, e.g., G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v.
American Indemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Comm.App. 1929);
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, supra. But
X has no such liability unless P has unconditionally offered to settle
within the limit, Jones v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 253 S.W.2d 1018
(Tex.Civ.App. 1952 error ref'd n.r.e.), and it is unlikely that P will do so
unless he is cognizant of the insurance coverage. But if D is judgment
proof and thus has no risk of monetary loss, it seems that as a matter of
law he has no existing interest which X could negligently or in "bad
faith" represent.
Thus in no case would disclosure jeopardize D's interest, and disclosure
may lead to a settlement offer safely within the policy limit. On the other
hand, X would normally prefer secrecy, particularly if the coverage
should exceed the settlement value. If P should insist on a settlement
higher than the theoretical settlement value, X can still protect its interest
by refusing settlement if it acts consistently with its obligation to D. But
non-disclosure may mean many things to IP: X may be awaiting the eve
of trial to disclose the low policy limits, to possibly avoid excess liability
by keeping D from disclosing the limit, or to delay in expectation thatP
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might settle below the policy coverage and settlement value. In the
negotiations P has all his cards on the table while X may be bluffing.
Thus a forced disclosure would protect D, would assure P of a bargaining
position based on mutual knowledge, and would deprive X only of the
bargaining power inherent in secrecy, bluffing or fraud. In California,
compelling disclosure in a proceeding to perpetuate testimony seems to
have been accepted as fair to all sides of the triangle. See Superior Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951); Sedgwick,
Personal Injury Litigation from the Insurance Company-DefendantPoint of View,23 UTAHB. BULL. 101,111 (1951).
The prophylactic effect of just bargaining based on mutual knowledge
-. e., swifter settlements and prevention of fraud-indicates the practi-
cal relevancy of insurance to the "subject matter of the action." It appears
that these considerations, rathethahan the strict interpretation relied upon
in the principal case, express the objectives of modem rules of civil pro-
cedure.
Maco Stewart
HOMESTEAD-SALE WITH OPTION To REPURCHASE AS ESCAPE
FROM CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST MORTGAGING
THE HOMESTEAD.-Rosinbaum v. Billingsley, 272 S.W.2d
591 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1954, error ref'd n.r.e.).
The plaintiffs conveyed their homestead by warranty deed to the
defendant, who simultaneously executed a contract allowing the plaintiffs
to remain in possession without paying rent and giving them an option
to repurchase within eight months. After the option to repurchase had
expired, the plaintiffs sued to cancel the deed on the ground that the
transaction was void as a mortgage of their homestead. Held, the deed
was valid as a sale with an option to repurchase; it was not intended as
a mortgage since the relationship of debtor and creditor did not exist
between the parties.
A mortgage of the homestead by a married couple or a pretended sale
with a condition of defeasance is void in Texas, except where given as
security for purchase money or improvements. Tux. CONST. art. 16 § 50;
Burkhardt v. Lieberman, 138 Tex. 409, 169 S.W.2d 847 (1942). Since
only pretended sales involving a condition of defeasance are prohibited,
Red River Nat'l. Bank v. Latimer, 110 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.Civ.App. 1937),
an actual sale with a provision whereby the seller may reacquire title is
valid. Astugueville v. Loustaunau, 61 Tex. 233 (1884).
The courts consider several factors in determining whether a trans-
action is a mortgage or a sale with an option to repurchase. The most
persuasive indication of a mortgage is the existence of a debt to be secured,
i.e., a debtor-creditor relationship. John T. Hardie & Co. v. Campbell, 63
Tex. 292 (1885); Ruffier v. Womack, 30 Tex. 332 (1867). Evidence that
the purchase price was less than the reasonable market value and the
absence of a specific time or price for repurchase also indicate a mortgage.
Gray v. Shelby, 83 Tex. 405, 18 S.W. 809 (1892); Mansfield v. Orange
Inv. Co., 260 S.W. 307 (Tex.Civ.App. 1924). When combined with the
primary factors, retention of possession by the grantor and repayment
of the alleged purchase price with interest lend support to the finding
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of a mortgage. Kainer v. Blank, 24 S.W. 851 (Tex.Civ.App. 1894). How-
ever, the presence of these secondary factors alone do not evidence a
mortgage as a matter of law, but the intention of the parties, the con-
trolling element, is a question for the jury. Alstin v. Cundiff, 52 Tex. 453
(1880); Mansfield v. Orange Inv. Co., supra.
Correlatively, the existence of an option resting with the grantor to
repurchase at a specific time is indicative of a valid conveyance and option
to repurchase. Brannon v. Gartman, 288 S.W. 817 (Tex.Comm.App.
1926); Ruffler v. Womack, supra.
Generally, the intent of the parties will control over the form and
ostensible meaning of the conveyance. John T. Hardie & Co. v. Campbell,
supra. This is just, since the grantor's right to defend his homestead should
not be made to depend solely on the instruments. Mosher Steel & Machin-
ery Co. v. Nash, 6 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.Civ.App. 1928, error dism'd). Where
the true intent is not disclosed by the instruments, the jury must ascer-
tain it from all the facts and circumstances of the case, Alstin v. Cundiff,
supra, and parol evidence is admissible to show the character of the trans-
action. Young v. Fitts, 183 S.W.2d 186 (Tex.Civ.App. 1944, error ref'd,
want of merit); Mansfield v. Orange Inv. Co., supra.
If the courts intend to follow the spirit and purpose of the constitutional
prohibition against mortgaging the homestead, use of the sale with an
option to repurchase, although clearly recognized in Texas, should be
narrowly confined. However, the homestead is often the most valuable
asset owned by a family, and this device provides a means for raising
needed capital. The risk involved in the sale with an option to repurchase
may prevent its widespread use, but if necessity compels resort to this
method of financing, the courts should first be certain that an actual sale
was intended, and then enforce the obligations imposed by the trans-
action. To protect the homestead owner from hasty action in an emer-
gency, the courts seem to require that (1) the buyer pay the reasonable
market value of the property; (2) the option to repurchase rests with the
seller; and (3) there exist no debtor-creditor relationship. The principal
case indicates these requirements may be satisfied even where the seller
remains in possession without paying rent and retains an option to buy
back at the original selling price.
William E. Watson, Jr.
INCOME TAX--SELLER IN POSSESSION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
HELD To RECOGNIZE INCOME AT DATE OF BILLING.-Pacific
Grape Products Co., 17 T.C. 1097, rev'd, 219 F.2d 862 (9th
Cir. 1955).
A canner of fruit products reported its income on a calendar-year
accrual basis. During the canning season contracts of sale were signed,
and according to trade custom the taxpayer billed buyers for goods on
hand at the end of the year. Although completely processed, the goods
were not labeled, cased, segregated, or paid for. The Commissioner
sought to defer recognition of income to the following year when the
goods were shipped. Held, the seller's method of recognizing income upon
billing clearly reflected income.
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"Gross income" includes income derived from the sale of property.
INT. REV. CODE S§ 22(a) 111 (1939). If the accounting method is to
reflect income clearly, as § 41 requires, a proper determination of when
a sale has been made is essential, although sometimes difficult. Comm'r
v. Segall, 114 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1940); 2 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION g 12.118 (1942). The regulations make transfer of title con-
clusive in determining when a sale from inventory is consummated;
thus it is necessary to consult local property law. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118,
39.22(a)-5 (1942); Modesto Dry Yards, Inc., 14 T.C. 374 (1950).
The principal case involved fungible goods which the seller had com-
pletely processed and had stacked according to variety, size, and grade.
It is generally recognized that an undivided share of a specific mass of
fungible goods may be sold, the buyer and the seller becoming owners
in common of the mass. UNIFORM SALES ACT S 6(2); Horr v. Barker,
6 Cal. 489 (1856). Applying the "title" test, the court looked to the law
of California, where the Sales Act has been adopted, CALIF. CIVIL CODE
§ 1721-1800 (Deering, 1949), and determined that the common under-
standing in the canning industry is that title passes upon billing and that
the parties so intended. 219 F.2d at 865.
This reasoning is contrary to generally-accepted commercial law con-
cepts concerning transfer of title. The fungible goods doctrine applies to
a specific mass of goods. UNIFORM SALES ACT S 6. At the time of billing,
the buyers apparently were unaware of where the goods were located,
and therefore could not have intended to become joint owners of this
specific mass. VOLD, SALES § 72 (1931). Also, since no mass existed at
the time of signing, the contract was for the sale of future goods; to pass
title, an appropriation to the contract was necessary, UNIFORM SALES
Act § 19, Rule 4(1); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Peters, White & Co., 187
App. Div. 376, 176 N.Y.S. 169, rev'd 233 N.Y. 97, 134 N.E. 849 (1922),
in addition to completion of processing. UNIFoRM SALES ACT § 17. The
necessity for subsequent appropriation cannot be obviated by the in-
tention of the parties. 2 WILLISTON, SALES 9 275a (rev. ed. 1948);
VOLD, supra.
Assuming that the principal case accurately interpreted and applied
California law, its approach nevertheless reflects the difficulty in as-
certaining when a sale has been consummated. It has frequently been
said that the "title" test is not conclusive. See Comm'r v. Segall, supra;
Brown Lumber Co. v. Comm'r, 35 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1929); Comment,
22 NOTRE DAME LAw. 336 (1947). In United States v. Utah-Idaho Sugar
Co., 96 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1938), contracts for the sale of sugar stored in
different warehouses by the seller but not delivered, appropriated to the
contract, or specified by the seller in the taxable year, were held to con-
stitute "sales" when the contracts were signed. The court declared that it
was unnecessary to determine the incidence of "title" and based its de-
cision on the creation of a "present, binding, and enforceable obligation
of sale on the.., taxpayer... and buyer ..... for tax purposes. Id. at 759.
Yet no case has been found where a seller, continuously retaining pos-
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session, had to recognize income in a period different from the one in
which "title" passed.
Use of the "title" test tends to create an illusion of certainty and thus
to obscure actualities upon which decision should turn. Commercial law
has recognized that neither a legal doctrine nor a court decision can be
based upon "title" as a uniform and invariable concept. Instead, em-
phasis is placed upon the operative facts. Corbin, The Uniform Com-
mercidl Code-Sales, 59 YALE L.J. 821 (1950). Since the process of de-
termining what is a "sale" for income tax purposes is still in its compar-
ative infancy, the facts in each tax case assume even greater importance.
Apart from the question of title, the court in the principal case
thought that the seller's method of accounting clearly reflected income.The system had been adopted and consistently applied by the canning
industry; it was reasonably adapted to its purposes and should not, thecourt said, be condemned by abstruse legal reasoning. 219 F.2d at 869.
The court utilized a sound, pragmatic approach in considering the ex-
trinsic facts and the parties' treatment of the contract. See Comment,46 YA L.J. 272 (1936). Several of these facts had proven significant inprevious cases: at the agreed billing date the canner had completed
processing the goods and had incurred the attributable expenses, see
United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926); shipping and broker-
age expenses relating to the merchandise were determinable with reason-
able accuracy and had been accrued, see Harrold v. Comm'r, 192 F.2d
1002 (4th Cir. 1951); sufficient goods were on hand to fill all outstanding
orders and any pledged goods would have been freed for shipment to
buyers, see Friedman, Field Warehousing, 42 COLUIM. L. Rmv. 991(1942); and the goods were held at the risk of the buyers, see Ohio Brass
Co., 17 B.T.A. 1199 (1929). Further, there was a binding contract re-quiring payment by the buyers, see United States v. Utah-Idaho Sugar
Co., supra; no external factor rendered ultimate completion of the con-
tracts by either the seller or buyers contingent, see The Federal Machineab Welder Co. v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 952 (1948),aff'd, 184F.2d 843 (6thCir.
1950)1; and the sellers right to the proceeds was fixed according to the
understanding and custom in the industry. See United States v. Amalga-
mated Sugar Co., 72 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1934).
Of course, an accounting method of itself is not conclusive. Brown v.
Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934). But where an industry's established
practice is to recognize a sale when a contract has been substantiallycompleted, an accounting method reflecting the business practice should
be determinative. To rely upon such considerations as these rather than
upon obscure legal reasoning is both realistic and modern. See S. rl. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1954) (seeking to increase the similarity
between income tax and business accounting); Beacon Publishing Co. v
Comm'r, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955).; MAGIL, TAxABLE IrcoM 215
(rev. ed. 1945). Even if the transfer of "title" is treated as determinative,at least the accounting method should be considered an important op-




LIMITATION OF ACTIONs-FILING OF PLAINTIFF'S PETITION
DOES NOT TOLL RUNNING OF LIMITATION PERIOD ON
COUNTERCLAIM.-Raney v. White, 267 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.
Civ.App.-San Antonio, 1954, error ref'd).
The plaintiff sued for the reasonable rental value of a holdover
tenancy. Thirteen years later the defendant counterclaimed for the value
of repairs and improvements on the property, a claim which the plain-
tiff's petition had anticipated without admitting. The plaintiff's plea of
limitation to the defendant's counterclaim was sustained. Affirmed.
The holding reiterates the basic Texas rule, see Fowler v. Stoneum, 11
Tex. 478 (1854), but many old cases made an exception for liquidated
"set-offs," i.e., liquidated counterclaims opposing liquidated claims,
limiting the basic rule to pleas in reconvention and to unliquidated set-
offs. See Walker v. Fearhake, 52 S.W. 629 (Tex.Civ.App. 1899). Pleas
in reconvention were counterclaims arising out of the same transaction
as the plaintiff's claim. Egery v. Power, 5 Tex. 501 (1851). And while
set-offs usually involved liquidated claims, 1 TIDD, PRACTICE *644
(1828), there is some authority that set-off in Texas included an un-
liquidated counterclaim opposing an unliquidated claim where they in-
volved breach of unrelated contracts. Sanders v. Bridges, 67 Tex. 93, 2
S.W. 663 (1886). Other Texas cases have cast doubt on the exception of
liquidated set-offs recognized in Walker v. Fearhake, supra, at least one
assuming without discussion that the limitation period for any counter-
claim, including a set-off, is not interrupted until it is properly asserted
in court. Uvalde Construction Co. v. Joiner, 132 Tex. 593, 126 S.W.2d
22 (1939) (semble); see Comment, 18 TEXAs LAw REVIEw 209 (1939).
No appellate case directly involving the validity of the set-off ex-
ception has been decided since Uvalde Construction Co. v. Joiner, supra.
The principal case follows the basic rule that the limitation period for a
counterclaim runs until it is filed, but the claim was not a liquidated
(set-off-type) counterclaim. Similarly, a federal court has followed the
rule in applying a Texas limitation statute to bar an unliquidated coun-
terclaim for damages arising out of a construction contract upon which
the plaintiff's claim rested. Texas Water Supply Corp. v. RFC, 204 F.2d
190 (5th Cir. 1953). One case purporting to state a rule regarding set-
off actually involved a defense improperly pleaded as a set-off. See
Stagal Oil Co. v. Bartholomew, 144 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex.Civ.App. 1940,
error dism'd by agreement); see also, Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Sneed, 91 S.W.2d 1102 (Tex.Civ.App. 1936). Defenses, i.e., matters that
would serve to defeat the plaintiff's cause of action, as distinguished from
claims for affirmative relief, are not generally subject to statutes of limi-
tation. Morris-Buick Co. v. Davis, 127 Tex. 41, 91 S.W.2d 313 (1936);
Murphy v. Sills, 268 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.Civ.App. 1953, error dism'd);
Runnells County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 209 S.W.2d 969 (Tex.Civ.App. 1948,
error ref'd).
In most jurisdictions any counterclaim not barred when an action is
begun can be urged during the pendency of the action, regardless of
limitation. Tom Reed Gold Mines Co. v. Brady, 55 Ariz. 133, 99 P.2d 97
(1940); Jones v. Mortimer, 28 Cal.2d 627, 170 P.2d 893 (1946); National
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Retailers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gross, 142 Ohio St. 132, 50 N.E.2d 258
(1943). Radically different and complex rules are applied where limi-
tations have already run on a counterclaim when the plaintiff com-
mences his action. See California Trust Co. v. Gustason, 15 Cal.2d 268,
101 P.2d 74 (1940); Francisco v. Francisco, 120 Mont. 468, 191 P.2d
317 (1947); Bryant v. Swetland, 48 Ohio St. 194,27 N.E. 100 (1891). In
all jurisdictions other than Texas distinctions between types of counter-
claims have not been considered in ascertaining the tolling effect of a
plaintiff's filing suit at a time when a counterclaim is not barred. See
Annot., 127 A.L.R. 909 (1940).
The solitary stand taken by Texas in making a distinction favoring
set-offs was based upon doubtful authority before 1941, and the cases
supporting it had offered no practical reason why a liquidated counter-
claim should be treated more leniently than a claim arising out of the
same transaction as the plaintiff's claim. The distinction has even less
basis since the adoption of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, even
though limitation statutes are substantive laws which the new procedural
rules cannot change. Tnx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1731a. The
rules group all the old types of counterclaims, and some new ones, into
one category, "permissive counterclaims," without regard to the set-off
and reconvention concepts. See T x. RuL.s Civ. P. 97. Since the rules
have also made some counterclaims compulsory, following the set-off
exception today would result in some of these being barred by letting
limitations run until the counterclaim is filed, while some permissive
counterclaims would be privileged to have limitations tolled by the filing
of plaintiff's petition.
The few cases decided since 1941 indicate that Texas is still not dis-
posed to follow the majority rule that the limitation period for all coun-
terclaims is interrupted by the commencement of the plaintiff's action.
But those cases are not conclusive that in Texas the period continues to
run for all counterclaims after the plaintiff's petition is filed, since the
post-1941 cases involve only counterclaims similar to reconvention. They
do not conclude the question concerning other types of permissive coun-
terclaims, particularly those resembling liquidated set-offs, for which the
courts could revive the old set-off distinction. Texas courts have thus far
not made a distinction favoring the new compulsory counterclaims pro-
vided for in the Texas and Federal procedural rules, but the point was
not discussed in the two cases involving compulsory-type counterclaims.
See Texas Water Supply Corp. v. RFC, supra, and the principal case;
TEx. RULES Civ. P. 97; FED. R. Civ. P. 13. Were Texas courts to hold the
period interrupted, at the filing of plaintiff's petition, for some or all
counterclaims, it might make no difference in cases like the principal one
because of the long delay in prosecution of the counterclaim. See T x.
Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 5526, 5527.
Texas courts should use the opportunity afforded by the new grouping
of counterclaims to clarify and make realistic the rules governing limi-
tation of counterclaims. Because of the confused rulings concerning the
tolling effect of the plaintiff's commencement of action, stare decisis is
not a strong impediment to reform, although it might preclude adoption
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in Texas of the majority rule that the period is interrupted for all coun-
terclaims. But the baseless set-off distinction that favors liquidated claims
should be conclusively denied, and the courts should consider a rule
that the filing of the plaintiff's petition interrupts the period for a com-
pulsory counterclaim-one that would usually involve much the same
issues and evidence as the plaintiff's action. If this latter step is beyond
judicial power, legislative action should be taken.
Robert A. Fairey
PRACTICE AND PROCEDUE-BROAD SUBMISSION OF SPECIAL
ISSUE ALLOWED IN ACTION BASED UPON INTENTIONAL As-
SAuLT.--Greiger v. Vega, 271 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Sup. 1954).
The defendant pleaded self-defense in a wrongful death action predi-
cated upon the intentional killing of the plaintiff's son. The only special
issue submitted was "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence
that the action of... [the defendant] in shooting and killing the deceased
was wrongful?" The plaintiff requested the following special issues:
(1) At the time the deceased was killed, was he assaulting the defendant?
(2) Was the assault of such a nature as to produce in the defendant a
reasonable expectation of death or serious bodily injury? (3) Did the
defendant use more force than was necessary in his self-defense? (4) Had
the defendant at his disposal other reasonable means of repelling the
attack? The trial judge ruled that each of the plaintiff's requested issues
was comprehended by the instruction defining the term "wrongful."
Affirmed.
If a case is submitted on special issues, the court must submit each
issue "distinctly and separately," TEX. RuLEs Civ. P. 277, but only the"controlling issues made by the written pleadings and the evidence" need
be submitted. TEX. RuLs Civ. P. 279. Seemingly, in framing submissible
issues no distinction should be drawn between negligence and non-negli-
gence cases. However, the rule is otherwise.
It is well settled that submission of very broad issues in negligence cases
is reversible error. Roosth &e Genecov Production Co. v. White, 152 Tex.
619, 262 S.W.2d 99 (1953); Wichita Falls & Oklahoma Ry. v. Pepper,
134 Tex. 360, 135 S.W.2d 79 (1940); Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., 111 Tex.
461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922); Gulf C. c&S. F. Ry. v. Mangham, 95 Tex. 413,
67 S.W. 765 (1902). The leading case is Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., supra,
holding it error to submit the issue of the plaintiff's "contributory negli-
gence in his conduct in, around, or about the elevator, or the shaft there-
of, prior to or at the time he was injured." On the basis of the statute then
in force, TEX. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 2189 (presently embodied
in TEX. RULES Civ. P. 277), the court established the rule that an issue
must be submitted "distinctly and separately" on each group of facts
pleaded which, if proved, would constitute a separate ground of recovery
or defense.
This restrictive interpretation, however, does not generally prevent the
submission of broad issues in non-negligence cases. For example, Hough
v. Grapotte, 127 Tex. 144, 90 S.W.2d 1090 (1936), held that residence
and intention were merely elements of the "controlling" issue of domicile,
and Houston v. Lurie, 148 Tex. 391, 224 S.W.2d 871 (1949), upheld a
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submission of the issues that certain buildings constituted "serious fire
hazard[s]" and that they could be repaired without "substantial recon-
struction," even though each issue embraced a number of subsidiary
factual questions. Similarly, a submission of the issue that a defendant's
conduct made living with him "insupportable" was approved in a divorce
action. Howell v. Howell, 147 Tex. 14, 210 S.W.2d 978 (1948). Contra,
Egan v. Egan, 235 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.Civ.App. 1921, error dism'd). And
it was not error to submit an issue of "assault and battery" in those terms.
Whitaker v. Haynes, 128 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.Civ.App. 1939, error dism'd,
judgm't correct).
The identical submission which formed the seed of controversy in the
principal case was considered previously in McMurrey Corp. v. Yawn,
143 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Civ.App. 1940, error ref'd) and Barrow v. Barclay,
269 S.W. 235 (Tex.Civ.App. 1925, error ref'd). It seems that the cases
sanctioning broad submissions have relied principally on the precept that
only the "controlling" issues need be submitted. See T~x. RuLms Civ. P.
279. This apparently does not comport with the narrow construction pro-
pounded in the Fox case, that each separate ground of recovery or defense
constitutes an issue which must be submitted "separately and distinctly."
Resolution of this inconsistency hinges on the definition given "control-
ling," but the Rules themselves may be at least theoretically inconsistent.
In a recent negligence case, Roosth & Genecov Production Co. v. Whzit6,
supra, the trial judge submitted generally the issue that a derrick was
defective, instead of submitting separate issues concerning various alleged
defects. It was argued that he had properly submitted the "controlling"
issue, and that two cases previously mentioned, Houston v. Lurie, supra,
and Howell v. Howell, supra, represented a trend toward reducing the
number of issues by grouping a greater number of factual elements with-
in a single issue. The court distinguished those two cases as not being
negligence cases, and affirmed the rule of Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., supra.
The court of civil appeals in the principal case, Vega v. Grieger, 264
S.W.2d 498, 500 (1954), apparently believed the Roosth case condemned
a broad submission, but on appeal, the supreme court expressly repudi-
ated that idea and commended this manner of submission in other than
negligence cases. 271 S.W.2d at 88.
Although there may be practical reasons for distinguishing the sub-
mission of issues in a negligence case, it is suggested that the rules men-
tioned above, requiring the court to submit "distinctly and separately"
the "controlling issues made by the written pleadings and the evidence,"
should have the same effect in all types of cases. There is a decided trend
toward reducing the complexities of trial; however, the well-established
precedent makes it unlikely that the courts will soon depart from sub-
mission of detailed special issues in negligence cases. See especially the
assertion in the Roosth & Genecov case, supra, that to change the practice
by judicial decision would cause "undue confusion."
Joseph J. French, Jr.
TAxATION-VALIDITY OF TAXING SCHEME SYSTEMATICALLY
EXCLUDING BANK DEPOSITS FROM AsSESSMENT.-Whelan
v. State, 24 Tex.Sup.Ct.Rep. 484 (1955).
The petitioner, who had been adjudged liable for delinquent taxes,
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contended, inter alia, that the trial court had erred in excluding evidence
that bank deposits had been deliberately and systematically excluded
from the assessment roles. Reversed and remanded; the systematic ex-
clusion of bank deposits from the tax rolls is contrary to the constitution
and the statutes; if the taxpayer can prove substantial injury, he is en-
titled to relief.
Bank deposits are clearly subject to taxation. TEx. CONST. art. 8, § 1;
TEX. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 7145, 7147, 7149, 7152, 7162. The
fact that an ordinary bank deposit creates a debtor-creditor relationship
between the bank and the depositor does not alter its status as taxable
property. Campbell v. Riviere, 22 S.W. 293 (Tex.Civ.App. 1893, error
ref'd); Campbell v. Wiggins, 21 S.W. 730 (Tex.Civ.App. 1892), aff'd,
85 Tex. 424, 21 S.W. 599 (1892).
The state can no longer use the general property tax for general reve-
nue purposes, TEx. CONST. art. 8, S la, but the tax is still the principal
source of revenue for local taxing units. The problems involved in the
principal case illustrate the difficulties in administering the general prop-
erty tax and suggest a need for consideration of possible revisions in the
taxing process, particularly concerning the taxation of bank deposits and
money. At least four methods of dealing with the problems are possible:
(1) exemption of money and bank deposits from taxation; (2) enforce-
ment of the general property tax laws as they now stand; (3) taxation
of money and bank deposits at a different valuation or rate; and (4)
adoption of a different system of taxation.
Many factors, both practical and economic, favor an exemption of
bank deposits and money. The general property tax originated when
-wealth was largely in the form of tangible property. See, e.g., 1 GAM-
wEL, LAws OF TExAS 1319 (1837). As the forms of wealth multiplied,
bank deposits and money were added to the tax rolls. 8 GAMMEL, LAWS
OF TEXAS 1111 (1876). However, the accessibility of real property rec-
ords led the assessors to center, attention upon real property and improve-
mnents, and this is an established custom today. Most attempts to tax per-
sonal property have been thwarted by evasion and by rendition at a
ridiculously low value. See Lutz, Public Finance 368 (4th ed. 1947).
Bank deposits and money, in particular, are not being taxed. On Decem-
ber 31, 1953, over six billion dollars on deposit in Texas banks was
subject to ad valorem taxation. THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED-
EBRAL RESERVE SYSTEM, MEMBER BANK CALL REPORT No. 130-CONDI-
TION OF MEMBER BANKS 16 (1954). On January 1, 1954, only twelve
million dollars was rendered as "money on hand or on deposit." TEx.
COMP. PUB. AccTs. ANN. REP. pt. II at 4,14 (1954). This great discrep-
ancy depicts the extent of evasion and the insignificant effect exemption
of bank deposits and money would have on revenues.
Enforcement of the ad valorem tax on money and bank deposits would
be extremely difficult. A depositor could convert these assets into tax-
exempt securities before tax day and reconvert them afterwards. Fur-
ther, a taxpayer could maintain his deposits in a non-taxing state or
county, or transfer them temporarily to another jurisdiction to avoid
tax assessment. In Texas money and bank deposits are taxable where
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the owner resides, TEx. CONST. art. 8, § 11; cf. Great Southern Life Ins.
Co. v. City of Austin, 112 Tex. 1,243 S.W. 785 (1922); Connor v. Waxa-
hachie, 13 S.W. 30 (Tex. Sup. 1889), but the administrative difficulties
of discovering unrendered bank deposits in other states and counties are
practically insuperable.
In the instant case the court correctly declared that taxing authorities
have no right to decide what property shall escape taxation, and that
it is the assessor's duty to ascertain each person's taxable property. In
theory, if all bank depositors fail to render their deposits as the law re-
quires, TEx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 7193, 7204, each assessor
must seek to ascertain from the banks the deposits, on assessment day, of
each depositor subject to his authority, and assess it as "unrendered" prop-
erty. TEx. CoNsT. art. 8, § 11; TEx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art.
7218. This would be an onerous, costly task, and from a political view-
point, might be more than an elected official could be expected to do.
Moreover, some assessors seem opposed to the tax on bank deposits and
money for practical and personal reasons. See The Austin American,
July 15, 1955, p. 1, col. 1. Many assessors who would otherwise favor
taxing money and bank accounts believe the revenue derived would not
justify the burden of administering and enforcing the tax.
The general property tax has been justified on the theory that the
value of a citizen's property is a good measure of the extent to which
he enjoys the benefits of government services and protection. Graves &
Prober, Equity Grounds for Property Taxation Re-examined, LAND Eco-
NomICs 144 (May 1951). As a broad generality this theory is no doubt
sound; however, it seems clear that many governmental services-e.g.,
police and fire-fighting protection, garbage and sewage disposal, con-
struction and maintenance of streets and roads-are more directly bene-
ficial to owners and users of real property than they are to owners of
intangibles such as bank deposits. Hence the theory seems to justify allo-
cating to these intangibles a proportionately lesser share of the tax bur-
den. The general property tax has also been justified on the theory that
the tax burden should be apportioned according to ability to pay and
that gross wealth is a good measure of this ability. This argument, too,.
may be sound enough so far as it goes, though as a support for the gen-
eral property tax it is seriously weakened by the fact that the authorities
generally agree that the progressive net income tax is the best measure
of ability to pay. See SHULTZ & HARus, AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE
372 (5th ed. 1949). But assuming its validity in this connection, it im-
plies that bank deposits, which characteristically produce less income
than does real estate, should be taxed at a lower rate or at a lower per-
centage of actual value. Many states so treat them. LUTZ, PUBLIC Fi-
NANCE 371 (4th ed. 1947). Other states have discarded the general prop-
erty tax in favor of other systems of taxation. See SHULTZ & I-ARIs,
supra, at c. XXIX. It is evident that some change is needed in the tax





TORTS-COMPARISON OF DUTY REQUIREMENTS IN MASTER-
SERVANT AND LANDOWNER-INVITEE LITIGATION IN TEXAS.
-- Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Robinson, 280 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.
Sup. 1955).
The plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment when he
slipped and fell on an oily floor in the defendant's warehouse. The de-
fendant, who was not covered by workman's compensation insurance,
argued it owed no duty to the plaintiff since the dangerous condition of
the floor was open and obvious. Held, for the plaintiff; to hold that an
employer owes no duty to protect an employee from open and obvious
defects would nullify the provision of the Workman's Compensation Act
taking away the defense of assumed risk from non-subscribing em-
ployers.
The result in the present case was correct and did no violence to the
usual elements of liability in employer-employee cases. According to the
common law, the employer owes his employee the duty to provide a
reasonably safe place to work, and if his employee is injured through
a breach of this duty, he may show as a matter of defense that the em-
ployee knew or should have known of the danger, or that the employee
assumed the risk. Patton v. Dallas Gas Co., 108 Tex. 321, 192 S.W. 1060
(1917); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Hynson, 101 Tex. 543, 109 S.W.
929 (1908); Poindexter v. Receivers of the Kirby Lumber Company,
101 Tex. 322, 107 S.W. 42 (1908). If an employer subject to the Work-
man's Compensation Act has not complied with it, he is deprived of these
common-law defenses. TEx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8306 § 1.
The present case is apparently the first in Texas in which it was
argued that the employer owed his employee no duty where the danger
was open and obvious. Probably the argument was urged chiefly because
of the uncertainty created by Robert E. McKee General Contractors v.
Patterson, 271 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Sup. 1954). See Keeton, Personal In-
juries Resulting From Open and Obvious Conditions--Special Issue Sub-
mission in Texas, 33 TEXAs LAw BaviEw 1 (1954). In that case an em-
ployee of the defendant's subcontractor was injured when his ladder
slipped on a slick gymnasium floor. The defendant was held not liable
because the defect was open and obvious and, the court said, the defend-
ant owed no duty to the plaintiff. The court reverted to an economic
master and servant theory that had full approval in the late nineteenth
century. Smith v. Baker, [1891] A.C. 325, 346. ("[M]aster may carry
on his work in a dangerous way and damage his servant-if the servant
is foolish enough to agree to it."). But since the McKee case involved
a landowner-invitee relationship the court purported to follow a series
of Texas cases involving landowner-invitee litigation that were con-
strued as authority for the holding. See Houston National Bank v. Adair,
146 Tex. 387, 207 S.W.2d 374 (1948); A. C. Burton Co. v. Stasny, 223
S.W.2d 310 (Tex.Civ.App. 1949, error ref'd); Marshall v. San Jacinto
Bldg., Inc., 67 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Civ.App. 1933, error ref'd want of
merit).
The reasoning of the McKee case necessarily involves a departure
from usual theories of negligence. The elements of a cause of action for
negligence are (a) a duty to act with reasonable care towards'the in-
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jured party; (b) a breach of that duty (i.e., negligence); and (c) an
injury resulting from the breach. PROSSER, TORTS § 30 (1941). If all the
elements are proved, recovery will follow unless the defendant shows
that the plaintiff was also negligent or that he voluntarily assumed the
risk. To say that a landowner has no duty to protect an invitee against
open and obvious defects is tantamount to declaring that the defendant
is not negligent because the plaintiff was negligent or had assumed the
risk. Such a qualification of the duty element is contrary to Texas cases
where, even though an invitee's injury was caused by an open and ob-
vious defect on the landowner's premises, a duty to protect her was
found. Walgreen Texas Co. v. Shivers, 137 Tex. 493, 154 S.W.2d 625
(1941). The more rational view is that though an open and obvious
defect is always relevant to the issue that a plaintiff has assumed the risk
or has been contributorily negligent, it is irrelevant to the issue of the
defendant's duty; i.e., the defendant, though negligent, is not liable.
Camp v. I. H. Kirkpatrick Co., 250 S.W.2d 413 (Tex.Civ.App. 1952,
error ref'd n.r.e.). The doctrine of the McKee case forces the plaintiff
to anticipate and rebut defensive matters as a necessary element of his
burden of proving the defendant's negligence.
In the McKee case the court relied upon cases in which there are dicta
that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff, but in each of those
cases the facts indicate that the court had determined as a matter of law
that the plaintiff had either assumed the risk or that the defendant was
not guilty of any negligent act. In this context it is difficult to distin-
guish between assumption of risk, volenti non fit injuria, and contribu-
tory negligence. Schiller v. Rice, 151 Tex. 116, 121, 246 S.W.2d 607,
610 (1952); Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, 150 Tex. 191, 195, 206, 238
S.W.2d 172, 174, 181 (1951). In A. C. Burton Co. v. Stasny, supra, the
plaintiff walked through a plate glass window with his head down,
thinking it was an open door. The defendant pleaded contributory neg-
ligence and assumption of risk as affirmative defenses. Although the
court said that the defendant owed no duty, the record was such that it
might have been held, as a matter of law, that the defendant was not
negligent or that either of the affirmative defenses was established. In
Houston National Bank v. Adair, supra, the plaintiff fell in descending
stairs which she claimed were inadequately lighted, slick and without a
proper hand rail. The court said that the defendant owed her no duty
since the defects were open and obvious, but it had already decided the
case on the ground that there was no evidence to raise a fact issue of
the bank's negligence. See Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 528,
235 S.W.2d 609, 622 (1950). The court said further that the plaintiff
"voluntarily exposed herself to such risks as existed." The duty of the
bank to its customers was not contested; indeed, it was conceded. Simi-
larly, the duty issue was not controlling in Hausman Packing Co. v. Btd-
wey", 147 S.W.2d 856 (Tex.Civ.App. 1941, error ref'd) (plaintiff in-
jured while alighting from defendant's meat truck), and in Marshall v.
San Jacinto Bldg., supra (plaintiff injured hand in revolving door in
defendant's building).
The landowner would be given ample protection in dose cases by
proper judicial surveillance of the issues of negligence, contributory neg-ligence or volenti non fit injuria. The McKee decision introduces an un-
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necessary, disturbing and regrettable complication in landowner-invitee
cases. See Camp v. J. H. Kirkpatrick Co., supra. The invitee's conduct
should be considered a matter of defense as in Schiller v. Rice, supra.
J. C. Zbranek
TORTS--MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--CITY HELD LIABLE FOR
FAILURE To ERECT WARNING SIGNS WHERE STREET REPAIR
CREATES A COLLISION HAZARD.--City of Austin v. Schmedes,
24 Tex.Sup.Ct.Rep. 369 (1955).
The plaintiff recovered judgment against the city for damages resulting
from the city's failure to provide signs directing traffic where barriers
erected in connection with street improvement had temporarily changed
the flow of traffic and had created a hazard of collision between automo-
biles. The city contended that erection of traffic signs is a governmental
function, and that it was consequently not liable for failure to give warn-
ing of traffic hazards apart from physical defects and obstructions in the
street itself. Affirmed.
Generally, a municipal corporation is not liable for acts of its employees
in the exercise of governmental functions, but it may be liable for their
acts in connection with proprietary functions. Houston v. Quinones, 142
Tex. 282, 177 S.W.2d 259 (1944); Amarillo v. Ware, 120 Tex. 456, 40
S.W.2d 57 (1931); Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118 (1884). In
attempts to differentiate these functions various distinctions have been
drawn; e.g., between activities beneficial to the general public and activi-
ties for municipal benefit only, Houston v. Quinones, supra; between
activities voluntarily undertaken and those required by law, Houston v.
Shilling, 150 Tex. 387, 240 S.W.2d 1010 (1951); between profit-yielding
activities and those performed without pecuniary return, Houston v.
Wolverton, 277 S.W.2d 101 (Tex.Sup. 1955). These tests are of doubtful
reliability, and in the principal case the court avows a restrictive attitude
toward the doctrine of municipal immunity without reference to any of
them.
The earliest American cases did not distinguish between municipal and
private corporations in respecting tort liability. Hooe v. Alexandria, 12
Fed. Cas. 461, No. 6666 (D.C. Cir. 1802). The distinction between govern-
mental and proprietary functions was first used as a means of conferring
upon municipal corporations a partial immunity from liability in Bailey
v. New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842), and it has been attacked as origi-
nating in mistake and continuing in fallacy. See Borchard, Government
Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926); Barnett, Lia-
bility of Municipal Corporations, 16 ORE. L. REv. 250 (1937). The doc-
trine was originally justified as one fostering infant municipalities.
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 129 (1924). It
has outlived this justification and is now generally condemned as having
little, if any, validity; but it is so deeply entrenched in precedents that
instead of rejecting it outright, the courts have tended to bypass it, paying
it lip service but consistently allowing recovery in certain types of cases.
Municipal immunity first began to disintegrate in motor vehicle cases
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imposing common-law liability for negligence, Green, Freedom of Liti-
gation (III), Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 IiL. L. BEv. 355 (1944),
and recent cases indicate other areas in which it has been limited. The
prevailing view is that street repair and improvement is a proprietary
function, Dallas v. Maxwell, 248 S.W. 667 (Tex.Comm.App. 1923);
Galveston v. Posnainsky, supra, while traffic regulation is a governmental
function. Parson v. Texas City, 259 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Civ.App. 1953,
error ref'd); Baker v. Waco, 129 S.W.2d 499 (Tex.Civ.App. 1939). The
activity considered in the principal case, erecting traffic warnings, has
both a governmental and a proprietary aspect. The tendency to give pre-
ponderant weight to the "proprietary" function of maintaining streets is
observable in connection with other activities having a prominent govern-
mental aspect. Promotion of public health is admittedly a governmental
function, yet construction and maintenance of storm sewers, grading of
streets to improve drainage, cleaning of streets, and weed-cutting have
been held incident to street maintenance rather than to guarding public
health. Dilley v. Houston, 148 Tex. 191,222 S.W.2d 992 (1949); Wichita
Falls v. Mauldin, 39 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.Comm.App. 1931); Ostrom v. San
Antonio, 94 Tex. 523, 62 S.W. 909 (1901); Houston v. Quinones, supra.
Likewise, protection against fire is generally viewed as a governmental
function, but locating fire hydrants has been held a proprietary function.
Kling v. Austin, 62 S.W.2d 689 (Tex.Civ.App. 1933). A collision with a
fire truck caused by physical defects in a street resulted in municipal
liability without regard to the fire protection activity in which the truck
was engaged. Port Arthur v. Wallace, 141 Tex. 201, 171 S.W.2d 480
(1943).
Other jurisdictions generally reflect the same trend toward holding
cities liable through the street doctrine. Hattiesburg v. Hillman, 76 SoA2d
368 (Miss. Sup. 1954), held that the city's duty to maintain streets in
safe condition extends to the neutral ground on either side of the traveled
way. Poorly illuminated or located traffic and safety islands, traffic but-
tons, and traffic regulation devices which obstruct or create a danger to
traffic have resulted in liability in spite of the basic city immunity for
traffic regulation. De Lahunta v. Waterbury, 134 Conn. 630, 59 A.2d
800 (1948); Rohwedder v. Chicago, 322 Ill. App. 700, 53 N.E.2d 496
(1944); East Coast Freight Lines, Inc. v. Baltimore, 190 Md. 256, 58
A.2d 290 (1948); Kamnitzer v. New York, 265 App. Div. 636, 40
N.Y.S.2d 139 (1943); Hamilton v. Dilley, 120 Ohio St. 127, 165 N.E. 713
(1929); Young v. Camden, 187 S.C. 414,198 S.E. 45 (1938). The extreme
to which this trend has been carried is shown by Splinter v. Nampa, 70
Idaho 287, 215 P.2d 999 (1950), in which the city was held liable for
permitting the location of a gas tank in an alley where it constituted a
foreseeable explosion hazard.
Municipal immunity is still a defense, however, in connection with
most municipal activities. See Parson v. Texas City, supra (faulty oper-
ation of traffic light for several days); Ynsf ran v. Burkhart, 247 S.W.2d
907 (Tex.Civ.App. 1952, error ref'd n.r.e.) (city failed to remove from a
city-controlled corner vegetation which obstructed view of an intersec-
tion); Presley v. Odessa, 263 S.W.2d 293 (Tex.Civ.App. 1952). It seems
that in the Ynsfran case the court could have held the city's conduct a
breach of its duty to maintain streets in a safe condition. Similarly, the
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strong dissent in the Parson case, asserting that the city's failure to repair
the defective traffic light for several days made the street unsafe and
constituted a violation of the city's duty, seems the better view.
Two recent Texas cases further illustrate the supreme court's attitude.
In Houston v. Wolverton, supra, a city employee negligently injured the
plaintiff while enroute to the city for the dual purpose of returning official
reports (a governmental function) and having a city car inspected (a
proprietary function); the court labeled the proprietary activity para-
mount, and held the city liable. In Lebohm v. Galveston, 275 S.W.2d 951
(Tex. Sup. 1955) the court held that a charter provision exempting the
city from liability for negligence in maintaining the streets contravened
the constitutional guarantee of a remedy for every injury. See 33 TXAS
LAw IEvIEw 1099 (1955).
The current trend evident in these decisions is but one facet of the
strong movement toward holding all levels of government liable for
injuries resulting from the negligent performance of enterprise functions.
Legislation is the panacea for this problem; the Federal Tort Claims Act,
New York Court of Claims Act, and the Oklahoma statutory waiver of
state, immunity exemplify steps thus far taken. But there is much the
courts can do to clarify the present confusion. They seem to be groping
for a. manageable distinction between mechanical or operative activities
and decisional functions. Some such fresh demarcation would be prefer-
able to the oft-evaded and near meaningless line sought to be drawn be-
tween governmental and proprietary functions.
Tom Rush Moody, Jr.
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - AUTOMOBILES - THE EMERGENCY
DocTRINE.-Meyer v. Whisnant, 121 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y.
1954).
The defendant motorist invoked the emergency doctrine to defeat his
guest passenger's charge that he was negligent in colliding with a car
which suddenly appeared in his lane. The trial court did not consider
the emergency issue but held the defendant negligent as a matter of law
for violating a traffic statute and submitted only issues of proximate
cause to the jury. The appellate division reversed and dismissed as a
matter of law, a judgment for the plaintiff, ruling the evidence insufficient
to hold the defendant guilty of actionable negligence proximately causing
the accident. Affirmed. The court concluded that the defendant was the
helpless victim of what was, beyond any dispute, an emergency created
independently of his own action.
The courts agree on only two aspects of the emergency doctrine: (1)
the emergency must not be created by the actor's own tortious conduct,
Windsor v. McKee, 22 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1929); Casey v. Siciliano,
310 Pa. 238, 165 Atl. 1 (1933) ; Luce v. Chandler, 109 Vt. 275, 195 Atl.
246 (1937); and (2) the necessity of choosing instantly between alterna-
tives will lessen the degree of care ordinarily required. Schmitt v. Emery,
211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942); Weinberg v. Pavitt, 304 Pa. 312,
155 Atl. 867 (1931); American Products Co. v. Villwock, 7 Wash.2d.
246, 109 P.2d 570 (1941). The critical question is the degree of care
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required. Some courts maintain the integrity of the general negligence
standard and treat an emergency as a mere circumstance in applying the
objective standard of ordinary care. Car & General Ins. Corp. v. Keal
Driveway Co., 132 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1943); Triestram v. Way, 286
Mich. 13, 281 N.W. 420 (1938); Barkshadt v. Gresham, 120 S.C. 219,
112 S.E. 923 (1922). Other courts acquit the defendant of negligence as
a matter of law in emergency situations, thereby creating a separate and
distinct standard of care. Kardasinski v. Koford, 88 N.H. 444, 190 Atl.
702 (1937) (instinctive action); Polonofsky v. Dobrosky, 313 Pa. 73, 169
Ati. 93 (1933) (honest exercise of his judgment).
Because of the courts' failure to crystallize the test actually utilized,
most jurisdictions cannot be satisfactorily classified. Texas is a good
example. Initially, the doctrine was explicitly stated as a mere aspect of
the standard of ordinary care, Hooks v. Orton, 30 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Civ.
App. 1930), but later cases have destroyed the original clarity. Beck v.
Browning, 129 Tex. 7, 101 S.W.2d 545 (1937); Dallas Ry. & Terminal
Co. v. Young, 155 S.W.2d 414,416 (Tex.Civ.App. 1941, error ref'd) (ic-
tua urging the test of the actor's own best judgment).
Still unsettled is the question of what issues are to be submitted to the
jury. White v. Munson, 162 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.Civ.App. 1942) (emer-
gency issue submission unnecessary if issues of primary negligence and
discovered perid are submitted); Garner v. Prescott, 234 S.W.2d 704
(Tex.Civ.App. 1950) (requiring inquiry concerning the presence of an
emergency and inquiry concerning the defendant's exercise of the care
that an ordinarily prudent person would use in the same or a similar
emergency). In Goolsbee v. Texas & N.O. R.R., 150 Tex. 528,243 S.W.2d
386, 387 (1951), the supreme court said, ". . . the doctrine may be...
invoked to lower the legal standard of care. . . ," but it failed to voice a
determinative formula resolving the conflicting and inconsistent lan-
guage of the courts of civil appeals.
The Garner case represents the present tendency to incorporate the
emergency doctrine as a factor in applying the standard of ordinary care.
R-EsTATEMENT, ToRTs § 296 (1934); Note, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 417.
Courts discussing the emergency doctrine have applied mental criteria
such as decision and judgment but have not discussed the propriety of
considering man's physical limitations, such as reaction time. The general
negligence standard attributes to the reasonable man the physical quali-
ties of the actor. PRosSEn, TORTS § 36 and cases cited at 227 (1941). How-
ever, even when the "instinctive action" test is used the actor must not be
"unfit" to act in some emergencies. Miller v. Daniels, 86 N.H. 193, 166
Atl. 30 (1933); PROssER, TORTS § 37 at 242 (1941). At least one court
implicitly recognizes physical limitations as an element in determiningliability, but it recommends no means of measuring these limitations.
Morrison v. Boston & M.R.R., 86 N.H. 176, 180, 164 At. 553,556 (1933)
("he plaintiff's psition [that t defendant coul ve acted to avoid
the collsion] defies te natua Imitatins ontesedof the mental and
physical activities of human beings.") If reaction time is accepted as a
relevant factor in applying the standard of ordinary care, despite the
difficulty of precise measurement, there may be some justification for the




No court has fully dealt with the basic problem of formulating a negli-
gence standard prescribing the required physical skill. Should the courts
require conduct like that of the driver of ordinary competence and re-
sponse, as suggested in Whicher v. Phinney, 124 F.2d 929 (1st Cir. 1942),
or consider the individual driver's particular experience, driver-training
and reaction? These divergent views remain unresolved.
J. W. Gary
WILLS--INcoRPORATION BY REFERENCE INTO HOLOGRAPHIC
WILLS.-Hinson v. Hinson, 280 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Sup.
1955); Johnson v. Johnson, 279 P.2d 928 (Okla. Sup.
1955).
The issue in each of the principal cases was whether a typewritten
will, invalid for failure to comply with the requirements of an attested
will, could be validated by a subsequently executed and unattested holo-
graphic document. Held by the Texas Supreme Court, an invalid non-
holographic instrument cannot be validated either on the theory of in-
corporation by reference or republication by a subsequent holographic
codicil. Held by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the holographic codicil
incorporated the prior invalid nonholographic will by reference, re-
published and validated it.
Generally all courts agree that a defective typewritten document can
be validated by a subsequent attested instrument properly executed. This
may occur by integration, Kyle v. Jordan, 187 Ala. 355, 65 So. 522
(1914); Goethe v. Browning, 146 S.C. 7, 143 S.E. 362 (1928); In re
Sleeper, 129 Me. 194, 151 AtI. 150 (1930)-i.e., the earlier, defective
instrument and the later one are regarded as a single instrument in the
physical sense, validated by proper execution of the later portion-or
by republication or incorporation by reference. Beall v. Cunningham,
3 B. Mon. 390, 42 Ky. 390 (1843); McCurdy v. Weall, 43 N.J. Eq. 333,
7 Atl. 566 (1886); Campbell v. Barrera, 32 S.W. 724 (Tex.Civ.App.
1895). Thus, if the first will is defective because of improper execution,
Estate of Plumel, 151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192 (1907); Beall v. Cunningham,
supra; Kelly's Estate, 236 Pa. 54, 84 Atl. 593 (1912), failure to sign the
will, Doe v. Evans, 1 Cromp & Mees 42, 149 Eng. Rep. 307 (1832); Beall
v. Cunningham, supra; McCurdy v. Weall, supra, lack of testamentary
capacity, Brown v. Riggin, 94 M. 560 (1880); Manship v. Stewart, 181
Ind. 299, 104 N.E. 505 (1914); Stevens v. Myers, 62 Ore. 372, 121 Pac.
434 (1912), or undue influence or fraud, Estate of Baird, 176 Cal. 381,
168 Pac. 561 (1917); Taft v. Stearns, 234 Mass. 273, 125 N.E. 570
(1920); Campbell v. Barrera, supra, a properly executed and attested
codicil republishes or incorporates and revives the will so as to render
it effective.
Most judicial opinions, including those in the principal cases, do not
distinguish clearly between republication and incorporation by ref-
erence, but Atkinson contends that if the first will was never valid it
cannot be revived or republished, but can be effective only on the theory
of incorporation by reference. ATKINSON, WILLS, g§ 89, 90 (2d ed.
1953). This distinction is important since the doctrine of incorporation
generally requires that the extrinsic docunmt be in existence when
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the will is executed, be referred to as being in existence, and be iden-
tified satisfactorily. ATiNSON, WILLS, § 80 (2d ed. 1953. The doctrine
of republication, on the other hand, operates as a re-dating of the original
will based on the presumed intent of the testator. ATKINSON, WILLS, §
91 (2d ed. 1953).
Because holographic wills must be entirely in the testator's hand-
writing, Estate of Thorn, 183 Cal. 512, 192 Pac. 19 (1920) ; In re Will of
Lowrance, 199 N.C. 782, 155 S.E. 876 (1930); Dean v. Dickey, 225
S.W.2d 999 (Tex.Civ.App. 1949 error ref'd), they have presented ad-
ditional obstacles to integration and incorporation. The courts have been
strict in refusing to allow integration of nonholographic matter into a
holographic will, Estate of Thorn, supra; In re Wolcott's Estate, 54 Utah
165, 180 Pac. 169 (1919), unless the nonholographic matter may be dis-
regarded as surplusage. In re Will of Lowrance, supra; Baker v. Brown,
83 Miss. 793, 36 So. 539 (1903); Gooch v. Gooch, 134 Va. 21, 113 S.E.
873 (1922).
In each of the principal cases the court recognized that if the instru-
ment in question had been a complete, integrated writing, partly type-
written and partly handwritten, it would have been invalid as a will for
want of attestation. There remained for consideration the possibility that
a holographic codicil may be regarded as incorporating and validating
an invalid typewritten will. The few courts that have considered this pos-
sibility have divided evenly. Those that have rejected it have objected
that by incorporation the extrinsic document would become "part and
parcel" of a will which is valid only if wholly handwritten. Sharp v.
Wallace, 83 Ky. 584 (1886); Hewes v. Hewes, 110 Miss. 826, 71 So. 4
(1916); In re Watts' Estate, 117 Mont. 505, 160 P.2d 492 (1945). The
courts which allow incorporation do so on the basis that the extrinsic
document does not become a "physical" part of the holographic will.
Estate of Plumel, supra; Rogers v. Agricola, 176 Ark. 287, 3 S.W.2d 26
(1928); In re Miller's Estate, 128 Cal. App. 176, 17 P.2d 181 (1932). One
writer has argued that incorporation should be recognized because there
is no greater danger of fraud or undue influence than there is if extrinsic
material is regarded as incorporated by an attested will. Comment, 16
TENN. L. BIv. 741 (1941). Another writer contends that incorporation
should be recognized since if printed words cannot be integrated into a
holographic will, incorporation of an entire typewritten page cannot be
logically justified. Mechem, The Integration of Holographic Wills, 12
N.C.L. IEv. 213 (1934).
While the decision in the Oklahoma case cannot be justified according
to the orthodox view of the doctrine of republication because the earlier
instrument was never valid, language in many cases suggests that courts
may overlook this requirement and allow republication. Rogers v. Agri-
cola, supra; Beall v. Cunningham, supra; McCurdy v. Weall, supra.
However, the decision is in line with the cases allowing incorporation.
The Texas Supreme Court, which had not previously considered the
problem, refused to recognize incorporation on the ground that the result
would be, in effect, to recognize a holographic will not wholly in the
decedent's handwriting. The decision followed the language in Adams v.
Mars, 213 S.W. 622, 626 (Tex.Comm.App. 1919), which indicated that
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nonholographic matter could not be incorporated into a holographic will,
although the actual result reached in that case is difficult to justify on any
other basis.
It seems to beg the question to reject the theory of incorporation on
the ground that the extrinsic material becomes a "part" of the will and
thus contravenes the precept that the will must be wholly handwritten
by the testator. If the doctrine of incorporation by reference is to be
recognized at all, it is difficult to justify the conclusion that it cannot be
extended to include holographic wills. Since matter incorporated into an
attested will is not required to be attested, it seems logically inconsistentto require that the matter incorporated into a holographic be in the testa-
tr's handwriting. That is the testator's handwriting in the subsequentcodicil that refers to and incorporates the extrinsic matter should be
sufficient to insure the genuineness of the prior document.
William A. Stout
WILLS-POWER OF APPOINTMENT-EXECUTION BY A GEN-
ERAL RESIDUAR Y CLAuS.-Republic National Bank of Dal-
las v. Fredericks, 274 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas
1955, error granted).
The testator's father devised prop erty "to the legatees and devisees of
my said son, in accordance with his last will and testament, if he shall
have a will, or if not, to his heirs at law .... The testator's will, executed
several years before his wife obtained a divorce, left all his property to
her. At his death he had no property subject to his disposal other than
that left by his father. In a contest between the testator's heir and his
former wife, held, the testator was the donee of a testamentary general
power of appointment which he had effectively exercised.
To exercise a power of appointment the donee must manifest an in-
tent to do so in the manenr specified by the donor. Scums, LAW OF
FuTum INTESTS § 2 69 (1936). The almost universal common-law rule
is that a power of appointment not referred to in a will is presumed un-
exercised, id. at § 270; thus a typical residuary clause does not suffi-ciently manifest the requisite intent. Arnold v. Southern Pine Lumber
Co., 123 S.W. 1162 (Tex.iv.App. 1909, error dism'd); Carlisle v. Dela-
ware Trust Co., 99 A.2d 764 (1953); Methodist Episcopal Home v. Tut-
hill, 113 N.J. Eq. 460, 167 At. 9 (1933) ; TESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 343
(1936). It is reasoned that a power is not property and does not enlarge
the donee s estate, so that the residuary clause does not refer to the prop-
erty subject to the power. SIMES, LAW oF UTURE INTrSTS § 270
(1936); AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.40 (Gasner ed. 1952).
The Massachusetts courts, however, assume that a layman will regard
the appointive property as his own, SIMES, LAw OF FUTUr INTERESTS
§ 270 (1936), and thus they presume that a residuary clause is an
exercise of the power unless a contrary intention appears in the will.
Armory v. Meredith, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 397 (1863). But cf. Boston Safe
Deposit ne Trust Co. v. Prindle, 290 Mass. 577, 195 N.E. 793 (1935).
Several states, not including Texas, have statutes establishing a similar
presumption. AMmuCAN LAw OF PROPERTY g 23.40 (Casner ed. 1952).
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An often-quoted opinion by Justice Story declares that the intent to
exercise a power is sufficiently manifested when the instrument in ques-
tion (1) refers to the power, (2) refers to the property to be appointed,
or (3) would be inoperative except as an execution of the power. Blagge
v. Miles, 3 Fed. Cas. 559, No. 1479 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). Although many
cases approve these criteria, Justice Story's opinion makes it clear that
they were not meant to be exclusive, and numerous courts have found
the required intention manifested by other circumstances. 5 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.40 (Casner ed. 1952); Wilmington Trust Co. v.
Grier, 19 Del. Ch. 34, 161 Atl. 921 (1932); White v. Graves, 104 Atl.
205 (N.J. Eq. 1918); Cooper v. Haines, 70 Md. 282, 17 Ati. 79 (1889).
Contra, Thompson v. Ehrlich, 148 S.C. 330, 146 S.E. 149 (1928). The
prevailing view is that a residuary clause is persuasive evidence of the
onee's intent to exercise the power if the donee's own property is small
in relation to the amount of appointive property. 5 AmERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY § 23.40 (Casner ed. 1952). Contra, Equitable Trust Co. v.
Causey, 24 Del. Ch. 259, 9 A.2d 714 (1939).
In Weir v. Smith, 62 Tex. 1 (1884), the donee made specific bequests
of part of the property subject to the power and then devised "all the
real estate belonging to me and not heretofore devised" to certain named
children. The court held that she had appointed only the property spe-
cifically referred to. Even in Massachusetts a residuary clause is inop-
erative as an appointment if a will shows that the testator was aware of
the distinction between his own property and that subject to appoint-
ment. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Prindle, supra. Similarly, if
the power concerns only an interest in property in which the donee owns
a separate interest, it is reasonable to conclude that if the will does not
otherwise refer to the power, a general devise or bequest, or a residuary
clause, is merely a disposition of the donee's interest, not an appoint-
ment. Weir v. Smith, supra; Arnold v. Southern Pine Lumber Co., supra.
In the instant case the court relied on the extrinsic facts that: (1) the
donee had knowledge of the provisions of his father's will when his own
will was executed, and (2) the donee's own property at that time was
"comparatively slight." But the court added that, if this reasoning "be
in any respect erroneous," the same result would be reached because
the donee left no property of his own at death, and his will would have
been totally ineffective except as an appointment. This reasoning is ques-
tionable. Reliance on the donee's lack of property when he died seems
inconsistent with the accepted view that the only circumstances which
may properly be considered in determining intent are those surround-
ing the execution of the will. 3 PAGE, WILLS § 1331 (3d ed. 1941).
Ramon A. von Drehle
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